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The constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits a
federal court from entertaining any suits in which a sovereign en-
tity, either a state or the United States,1 is named as defendant
unless the sovereign has consented to be sued. Despite the absolute
terms in which sovereign immunity is sometimes described, there
exist two fundamental limitations on its sweeping prohibition.
First, the legislature of the relevant3 sovereign (as opposed to the
sovereign itself) may tender the necessary consent through an ordi-
nary legislative act. Second, relying on an ancient fiction, known as
an "officer suit" or an "official capacity suit," courts may entertain
suits against officers of the sovereign and grant relief that effec-
tively runs against the government." Since a government can act
t A.B. 1985, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Chicago.
I Though the federal courts sometimes treat the doctrines of state and federal sover-
eign immunity differently, the precedents for each doctrine continue to be cited in cases
involving the other. Justice Frankfurter, for example, believed that "[t]he sources of the
immunity are formally different but they present the same legal issues." Larson v Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 US 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter dissenting). See
also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v Halderman, 465 US 89, 112-116 (1984) (heavily
relying upon the reasoning of Larson, a federal sovereign immunity case, in deciding a state
sovereign immunity case.) This comment generally accepts current Supreme Court prece-
dent holding that state sovereign immunity is as broad as federal sovereign immunity. As to
the possible sources of federal and state sovereign immunity, see note 16 and sources cited
therein.
' Writing for the Court, Justice Brandeis has declared, "[t]he rule that the United
States may not be sued without its consent is all embracing." Lynch v United States, 292
US 571, 581 (1934).
3 In the context of federal sovereign immunity, Congress has the power to tender the
consent of the United States. With respect to state sovereign immunity, Congress and state
legislatures share power to waive state immunity. See text at note 20.
' The officer suit, or official capacity suit, must be distinguished from suits against of-
ficers in their personal capacity. Official capacity suits seek injunctive or declaratory relief
ordering officers of the state to perform some action in their official capacity. Suits against
officers in their personal capacity seek relief directly from the officer personally, usually in
the form of money damages. Personal capacity suits have nothing to do with sovereign im-
munity since the officer, not the government, must pay any judgment. Still, some commen-
tators have argued that, because the government in practice usually pays the judgments
rendered against its officers, these suits are in fact another limitation on sovereign immu-
nity. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv
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only through its officers, the officer suit fiction presents a powerful
device by which the judiciary can check the ambit of sovereign im-
munity even in the absence of a legislative waiver.
If the officer suit fiction were pursued to the extreme, sover-
eign immunity would degenerate into a mere pleading rule. Yet the
officer suit fiction is itself limited, and sovereign immunity retains
some vitality. Suits against officers in their official capacities con-
tinue to be barred by sovereign immunity if the plaintiff seeks cer-
tain forms of relief, especially a monetary award or an injunction
that would lead to a monetary payment.6
In Edelman v Jordan,7 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of what relief could be obtained through the officer suit
fiction by plaintiffs contesting denial of statutory entitlement ben-
efits. The Court prohibited all "retroactive" relief because such re-
lief would have a "practical effect indistinguishable . . . from an
award of damages"8 and because it would "resemble a money judg-
ment payable out of the state treasury."9 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that "prospective" relief would be allowed even though such
relief might have "an ancillary effect on the state treasury." 10
Focusing on the Court's decision in Edelman, this comment
examines the officer suit fiction in the context of federal statutory
entitlement benefits. Section I of the comment briefly identifies
the origins of sovereign immunity and the role of the officer suit
fiction in entitlement litigation. Section II traces the historical ori-
gins of the limitations on the forms of relief available in an officer
suit, beginning with nineteenth century cases. Section III examines
the specific way in which Edelman reformulated these limitations
on the officer suit fiction. This section then attempts to establish a
working definition of the retroactive/prospective distinction as ap-
plied in Edelman and in lower court opinions.
Section IV examines the retroactive/prospective rule in greater
L Rev 209, 227-28 (1963).
' In Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 166 (1985), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name .... a suit against the
[government] entity." Nonetheless, the Court recognized that the officer suit fiction is a real
exception to sovereign immunity, holding that "[iln an injunctive or declaratory action
grounded on federal law, the State's [sovereign] immunity can be overcome by naming state
officials as defendants." Id at 169 n 18.
6 See Larson, 337 US 682 (federal sovereign immunity); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651
(1974) (state sovereign immunity).
415 US 651 (1974).
* Id at 668.
* Id at 666.
10 Id at 668.
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detail and concludes that the rule fails to achieve the Edelman
Court's stated objectives. This section then develops a limitation
on the officer suit fiction that demands an investigation into the
temporal dimension of the federal statutory and constitutional
rights of a plaintiff. Under this limitation, the officer suit fiction
would be available to enforce current federal rights but not to pro-
vide compensation or any other remedy for past violations of
rights. Finally, section V evaluates recent arguments by commen-
tators and courts that call for a repudiation of Edelman and a re-
turn to the nineteenth century version of the officer suit fiction.
Section V concludes with a brief look at how the Court has already
expanded the Edelman definition of prospective relief to protect
rights that the Court views as particularly important.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. General Principles of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in early Eng-
lish law, which provided that no subject could sue the sovereign
without his consent." This principle was justified in various ways,
including "[t]he king can do no wrong"' 2 and "it would be a logical
anomaly for the King to issue or enforce a writ against himself."'"
Despite the absolute terms in which English sovereign immunity
was stated, the doctrine had already been drastically circumscribed
by the time of the American Revolution. As Professor Jaffe has
shown, the King's immunity from suit was limited in two major
ways: by the petition of right, whereby the King granted a perfunc-
tory1" consent, and by suits against officers.' 5 Not surprisingly, the
American doctrine of sovereign immunity 6 has followed a similar
" "For Blackstone, as for earlier jurists and commentators, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was simply a way of stating that the king was not amenable to the jurisdiction of
his own courts unless he assented to such jurisdiction." Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh
Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 7 (Greenwood, 1972).
zz William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England *238 (Chicago, 1979).
" Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
Harv L Rev 1, 3 (1963), citing Sir Frederick Pollack and Frederic W. Maitland, 1 The His-
tory of English Law 518 (Cambridge, 2d ed 1898).
1 In England, the petition of right served as the means for the king to grant consent to
suit "as a matter of course." Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 7 (cited in note 11).
" Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 3 (cited in note 4).
16 There is some doubt as to the source of sovereign immunity for both the states and
the United States. The Eleventh Amendment is often cited as the source for state sovereign
immunity, but the text of this Amendment is extremely narrow:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
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course. Sovereign immunity is described in absolute terms, but in
practice it is heavily circumscribed by statutory consents to suit
(for example, the Federal Tort Claims Act 17 ) and by suits against
officers. Yet in both England and America, the background immu-
nity of the sovereign remains 8 and continues to be an important
means of limiting the dimensions of sovereign liability. 9
These general principles of sovereign immunity are applied
easily in the context of suits against the United States. For a plain-
tiff to recover money damages from the federal treasury Congress
must have waived federal immunity. Congress's power in this area
seems to arise out of its plenary control over the treasury, as ex-
pressed in the Appropriations Clause.20 The second limitation on
sovereign immunity, the officer suit fiction, allows the federal
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
US Const, Amend XI. In Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1889), the Court held that the Elev-
enth Amendment was adopted to return the interpretation of Article III to its original un-
derstanding, which protected the immunity of the states: "[T]he cognizance of suits and
actions [against the sovereign entities] ... was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States." Id at 15. Thus, the broad sovereign
immunity of the states is based not on the Eleventh Amendment but on an implicit limita-
tion of federal power. Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313, 322-23 (1934) (stating state sover-
eign immunity is an implicit limitation on Article I judicial power); Laurence H. Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 77 Harv L Rev 682, 697 (1976) (arguing
that the presumptive immunity of the states should be inferred from the Tenth, not Elev-
enth, Amendment); Calvin Massey, State Sovereign Immunity and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 56 U Chi L Rev 61 (1989).
Similarly, in Williams v United States, 289 US 553, 572-73 (1933), and in Monaco v
Mississippi, 292 US 313 (1934), the Court stated that Article III should be interpreted to
preclude suit against the United States, though the text gives no hint of any such immunity.
Id at 321-22. The Court's interpretation is nonetheless valid; the framers believed that sov-
ereign immunity was "one of the attributes of sovereignty" and part of the "general sense
and the general practice of mankind." Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The
Federalist Papers 481, 487 (Mentor, 1961).
17 28 USC §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1982).
1i Under both the petition of right and the FTCA, the power to limit recovery or to
withdraw consent remains. See Jacobs, Sovereign Immunity at 8 (cited in note 11), com-
menting that "the king might legally refuse to be impleaded;" California v Arizona, 440 US
59, 65 (1979) ("It is clear, of course, that Congress could refuse to waive the Nation's sover-
eign immunity in all cases or only in some cases but in all courts.").
1" In 19th century England, the theory of sovereign immunity was invoked so that the
petition of right would not make the Crown liable for the torts of her servants. Feather v
The Queen, 122 Eng Rep 1191, 1205 (QB 1865). In the United States there exist similar
limitations on legislative waivers of sovereign immunity (the analogue to the petition of
right). See Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and Mandatory Regulations,
54 U Chi L Rev 1300 (1987) (discussing a particularly important statutory limitation on the
United States' liability).
"0 US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 7. See also Federalist 58 (Madison), in Federalist Papers 356,
359 (cited in note 16).
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courts2' to issue injunctions against federal officers when they are
acting in violation of federal statutory or constitutional law. The
officer suit fiction is grounded in the Supremacy Clause,22 which
can be viewed as a limited consent to suit consistent with the rule
of law. 3
State sovereign immunity presents more difficult issues. Cer-
tainly, the state legislatures have the power to waive state sover-
eign immunity, but it is unclear to what extent Congress may abro-
gate state sovereign immunity. The question of the scope of
Congressional power in this area has generated a large body of case
law and academic literature. 24 This comment largely avoids this
question by focusing only on cases in which neither Congress nor
the state legislature has waived state sovereign immunity.
21 If Congress were to withdraw all jurisdiction (or at least all federal question jurisdic-
tion) from the lower federal courts, then the state courts would have to be available to issue
injunctions, even affirmative injunctions, against federal officers. The state courts would still
be bound by the Supremacy Clause and would be the only forum open for the vindication of
federal constitutional and statutory rights. Paul Bator, et al, Hart & Wechsler's The Fed-
eral Courts and the Federal System 423 (This is the conclusion of Henry Hart's famous
Dialogue.)
22 The officer suit fiction "gives life to the Supremacy Clause." Green v Mansour, 474
US 64, 68 (1985).
22 United States v Lee, 106 US 196, 220-221 (1882) (quoted in text at note 49) (justify-
ing the officer suit fiction on rule of law principles). The rule of law justification for the
officer suit fiction dates back nearly as far as sovereign immunity itself. See, John Locke
Two Treatises of Government, bk 2, ch XVII, § 206 ("For the King's Authority being given
him only by the Law, he cannot empower any one to act against the Law, or justify him, by
his Commission in so doing. The Commission, or Command of any Magistrate, where he
has no Authority, being as void and insignificant, as that of any private Man.... For 'tis
not the Commission, but the Authority, that gives the Right of acting; and against the Laws
there can be no Authority." (emphasis in original)).
, Using its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may waive state
immunity. Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976). However, there is great uncertainty
about the scope of Congress's other powers. The Court first articulated a theory of "con-
structive consent" that effectively permitted Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under its Article I powers. Parden v Terminal Ry., 377 US 184 (1964). But the theory of
constructive consent has now been overruled. Welch v State Dept. of Highways, 107 S Ct
2941 (1987). The Court must now decide whether Congress may waive state immunity to
suits brought by individuals when the state has tendered no consent, constructive or other-
wise. United States v Union Gas Co., 832 F2d 1343 (3rd Cir 1987), cert granted sub nom,
Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 108 S Ct 1219 (1988); see also, In re McVey Trucking, 812
F2d 311 (7th Cir), cert denied, 108 S Ct 227 (1987). This issue has generated much academic
commentary arguing that Congress can waive state immunity. Tribe, 77 Harv L Rev at 693-
99 (cited in note 16); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes
of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 Colum L Rev 1413, 1444-45 (1975); William A. Fletcher, A Historical In-
terpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant
of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan L Rev 1033 (1983);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpre-
tation, 83 Colum L Rev 1889 (1983).
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The second limitation on sovereign immunity, the officer suit
fiction, is also complicated by state sovereignty. The federal courts
may not enjoin a state officer when no federal interest is at stake,25
but may enjoin state officers who are acting in violation of federal
statutory or constitutional law.26 Since a state officer's duties are
defined by state and not federal law, there will be many situations
in which a state officer will be acting unlawfully but a federal court
will have no jurisdiction to enjoin her activity. Again, this com-
ment avoids these vexing state sovereign immunity issues by limit-
ing its focus to federal entitlements programs. In these cases, juris-
diction is premised on federal question grounds and the federal
courts' power to enforce the supremacy of federal law through the
officer suit fiction applies with equal force against federal and state
officers.
B. Sovereign Immunity in Entitlements Litigation
Though Congress has the power to waive both federal and
state sovereign immunity for federally subsidized entitlement pro-
27grams, these waivers are construed narrowly. Moreover, some
provisions of these programs can be read as express invocations of
sovereign immunity.2 8 Thus, in many instances, sovereign immu-
nity prevents entitlement beneficiaries from suing the government
directly, and the officer suit fiction provides the only remedy for
beneficiaries harmed by government illegalities.
In order to bring an officer suit in federal court, a beneficiary
must first allege that an officer has acted in violation of a valid
federal statute or the Constitution.29 Once this is shown, the suits
25 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v Halderman, 465 US 89 (1984) (holding that the
pendent jurisdiction of federal courts may not encompass suits to enjoin state officers under
state law).
26 Ex parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908).
27 Congress has effective power to pressure the states to waive sovereign immunity,
since it can condition the receipt of federal entitlement funds on the states' waiver. See
Edelman, 415 US at 673-74 (noting that Congress could impose such a condition on state
participation in federal programs). Alternatively, Congress could invoke the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the substantive provision by which it legis-
lates entitlement benefits. Congress could then waive state sovereign immunity pursuant to
its enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427
US 445 (1976). See, generally, Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional De-
mocracy, 1979 Wash U L Q 659. Professor Michelman argues that such rights could be
judicially created, whereas this comment only assumes that Congress may legislate such
rights under its § 5 powers.
28 Bartlett v Bowen, 816 F2d 695, 712 (DC Cir 1987) (Bork dissenting), reh denied,
Bartlett v Bowen, 824 F2d 1240 (DC Cir 1987).
29 Larson, 337 US at 690-691. In determining whether a federal officer has acted in
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against the officer will still be barred by sovereign immunity if the
plaintiff seeks certain forms of relief, especially a monetary award
or an injunction that would lead to a monetary payment. In
Edelman, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may sue a gov-
ernment officer to obtain prospective injunctive relief that compels
the government to comply with federal law in all future disburse-
ments of entitlement benefits. However, the Court expressly pro-
hibited "retroactive" relief, which would require the government to
pay benefits already due. This so-called "Edelman rule" has been
applied against both federal and state officers in suits challenging
an official's actions on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
The remainder of this comment focuses on the Edelman rule and
demonstrates that the Edelman prohibition on retroactive relief
functions as an arbitrary line that truncates the federal rights of
entitlement beneficiaries.
II. THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE EDELMAN RULE
While the specific rule formulated in Edelman was novel, the
basic tendency of the Court to withhold certain forms of relief in
officer suits was not new. In the nineteenth century, the officer suit
fiction was limited by common law rights. In that era, however,
such a limitation did not impede the enforcement of federal rights
since those rights were largely given their content by common law
conformity with constitutional and statutory law, a court will look not just at the officer's
action, but at the entire statutory scheme. Thus, even if a government administrator wrong-
fully denies a valid entitlement claim, the officer suit may not be available if the government
has provided alternative remedial procedures that comport with due process. Larson, 337
US 682, 703 n 27 (1949); Malone v Bowdoin, 369 US 643, 647-48 (1962). Thus, within an
overall statutory framework, an officer's "lawful authority" may encompass large discretion,
subject to further administrative review that provides due process and compensation when
mistakes do occur. See also, Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 39 (cited in note 4). This expansive
definition of an officer's lawful authority prevents plaintiffs from using the officer suit fiction
to circumvent the proper administrative process and, hence, acts as an exhaustion require-
ment that protects executive flexibility. Larson, 337 US at 704. See also id at 705 (Douglas
concurring) (noting that a contrary rule would "cause intolerable interference with public
administration" and would "clog this governmental function with intolerable burdens.")
Nonetheless, in actions against state officials under § 1983, the Court imposes no such
similar exhaustion requirement. See, Patsy v Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457
US 496 (1982). But compare Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527 (1981) (applying Larson-type
reasoning to a § 1983 takings suit brought by a state prisoner); Toledo, Peoria & W.R. Co. v
State of If., 744 F2d 1296, 1299 (7th Cir 1984) (applying Larson to § 1983 action seeking an
injunction to compel state officers to quiet title in plaintiff. The court denied relief since an
adequate remedy existed in the state courts.) See also Knight v New York, 443 F2d 415, 421
(2d Cir 1971) (refusing to allow a Takings Clause action against a state officer brought under
general federal question jurisdiction where the state had provided a remedy for alleged un-
constitutional action in the state courts).
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property rights. During the twentieth century, the character of in-
dividual rights against the government changed, and the federal
courts vastly expanded their power to enjoin state and federal of-
ficers. Yet, even prior to Edelman, the federal courts had em-
ployed some form of balancing test, or equitable discretion, in de-
ciding whether a requested injunction was barred by sovereign
immunity. Though the character of federal rights had changed, the
federal courts remained mired in the formal limits of the common
law officer suit.
A. Early History of the Officer Suit Fiction
The officer suit fiction in Supreme Court jurisprudence dates
at least as far back as Osborn v Bank of the United States.0 In
that case, Justice Marshall stated the basic proposition of the of-
ficer suit fiction: a government officer who acts outside his author-
ity is liable to suit.31 The defendant state officers in Osborn had
levied an unconstitutional tax on the Bank of the United States.
The lawful authority of the defendants to levy this tax was limited
by federal supremacy over state law, thus: "[I]f the law of the
State of Ohio be repugnant to the constitution, or to a law of the
United States made in pursuance thereof, . . . [it can] furnish no
authority to those who took, or to those who received, the money
for which the suit was instituted."32 Stripped of their state author-
ity, the defendants were little more than bank robbers who had
taken money "by violence."3 3 Therefore, Marshall upheld an in-
junction requiring them to return the Bank's money.34
The fiction invoked by Marshall was more than a mere plead-
ing rule. Once the officer had exceeded his lawful authority, he was
viewed by the court completely as a private party, not as a govern-
ment agent.3 5 The officer was "subject to suit only if he himself
-0 22 US 738 (1824). See also United States v Peters, 9 US 115 (1809) (Court upholds
admiralty jurisdiction in a suit arising out of a dispute between Pennsylvania and a citizen
from another state. Though the defendants in the case were wholly private parties, they
were acting as the executrixes of the former state treasurer.)
31 "[I]f the act be unconstitutional and void, it can be no justification, and both these
defendants are to be considered as individuals who are amenable to the laws." Osborn, 22
US at 837 (emphasis added).
32 Id at 859.
33 Id at 741 (statement of the case); see also id at 837 (referring to the taking as an
"illegal act.")
34 Id at 870-71.
35 Id at 837 (see quote in note 33). See also Locke, Two Treatises, bk 2, ch XVH, § 206
(full quote and cite in note 23) (stating that the act of a Magistrate without authority was
merely the act of a "private Man").
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had committed an actionable wrong,"3 and actionable wrongs were
defined in reference to the common law of torts and contracts that
binds all individuals, not in reference to constitutional and statu-
tory provisions that were binding on government agents.3 " Thus,
the court could order the officer "to perform only his own duties
and not those of the state."3 "
The nineteenth century version of the officer suit fiction may
seem formalistic and harsh by today's standards since it limited a
plaintiff's relief to cases in which a government officer was actually
committing a common law tort against him. But the fiction actu-
ally served the same purpose that it serves today; it provided a
means "to promote the vindication of federal rights." 9 In the nine-
teenth century, the rights of a plaintiff against the government
were primarily negative. The Constitution was viewed as "a charter
of negative rather than positive liberties,' 40 and few if any statu-
tory positive rights were created by early Congresses.4
Against this background, the nineteenth century version of the
officer suit proved an effective fiction for the vindication of federal
rights. If the government was interfering with personal liberty, the
officer could be enjoined as a common law tortfeasor unless he
could justify his actions under a constitutional state or federal
statute.42 Common law rights of property also received full protec-
tion, since the common law would view officers as trespassers un-
less they were acting within the constitutional limits of their gov-
ernmental authority.43
The full extent of officer suit's protection of private property
' David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Officers, 1984 S Ct Rev 149,
155.
37 "[T]he defendant officer still had to have a real interest in the controversy familiar to
the common law-enough to 'justif[y] a decree against him personally."' Michael G. Collins,
The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 Colum L Rev 212, 223 (1988)
(quoting Governor of Georgia v Madrazo, 26 US 110, 124 (1828).
38 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 163 (cited in note 36).
10 Pennhurst, 465 US at 105.
,0 Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir 1983).
41 This view corresponded to beliefs of the framers who "were not concerned that Gov-
ernment might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them." Jackson,
715 F2d at 1203. Indeed, the separation of national powers was, at least in part, "intended
to ensure the protection of individual rights-most prominently rights of property-against
the legislature." Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev
421, 435 (1987).
4' The classic example is a suit by a prisoner against the warden under writ of habeas
corpus. See United States v Lee, 106 US 196, 218, 220 (1882) (drawing a parallel between
the officer suit fiction and the theoretical underpinnings of habeas corpus).
43 See Meigs v McClung's Lessee, 13 US 11 (1815) (common law action of ejectment
sustained against federal officers).
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is highlighted by the facts of United States v Lee." The plaintiff,
son of the late General Robert E. Lee, sued under the common law
writ of ejectment to have federal officers removed from his lands.
The lands were seized during the Civil War when certain federal
officials misinterpreted a tax statute as requiring the actual record
holder of the land to personally tender the tax. The owner of the
property, at that time Mrs. Robert E. Lee, did not personally ap-
pear to tender the money. The federal officers seized the lands in
the name of the United States. By the time the suit was brought,
the United States had already been in possession of the land for
several years and had even located a military outpost and a ceme-
tery, Arlington National Cemetery, on the estate.4 Although the
action was technically against only the officers, the United States
was clearly the real party in interest.
The Court noted that sovereign immunity had been justified
as a means of protecting the sovereign from "repeated suits"
whereby the "means of carrying on his [the sovereign's] govern-
ment in war and in peace, and the money in his treasury" would be
submitted to the control of judicial tribunals.46 Nevertheless, the
Court ejected the officers from the land, even though the effects on
the property claimed by the government were enormous. The
Court was quite candid about the reasons underlying the fiction of
the officer suit, stating:
Looking at the question upon principle, and apart from the
authority of adjudged cases, we think it still clearer that this
branch of the defence [of sovereign immunity] cannot be
maintained. It seems to be opposed to all the principles upon
which the rights of the citizens, when brought in collision with
the acts of the government, must be determined. In such cases
44 106 US 196 (1882). For a more complete account of this politically and emotionally
charged case, see Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1971-73 (cited in note 24).
" Under the Edelman retroactive/prospective rule, the Lee lawsuit would seem to be
barred, since the unlawful taking occurred in the past. Yet, the courts still allow a plaintiff
who has property taken by the government to sue for the return of that property. See
Spruytte v Walters, 753 F2d 498 (6th Cir 1985) (on claim by prisoner that "he is entitled to
possess a tangible object [a paperback dictionary]," id at 506, the court held that injunctive
relief against state prison officials seeking the return of the object was not barred by
Edelman. Id at 514.). Nor does property taken have to be traditional common law property.
See Demery v Kupperman, 735 F2d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir 1985) (holding that Edelman does
not bar an injunction against state officer to restore plaintiff's medical license.) The continu-
ing act of holding the plaintiff's property is seen as an ongoing violation of law. Similarly,
this comment argues that the continuing act of withholding an entitlement benefit should
be viewed as an ongoing violation of law. See section IV.
'" Lee, 106 US at 206, quoting Briggs & Another v Light-Boats, 93 Mass 157 (1865).
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there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of
the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by
the officers of the government, professing to act in its name.
4 7
Although the Court technically treated the suit as one against
the officer personally,48 the Court explicitly recognized that this
fiction was directed towards protecting "the rights of the citizens"
guaranteed under the federal Constitution. The officer suit fiction
was simply a necessary corollary to the rule of law principles em-
bodied in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution:
All the officers of government... are creatures of the law, and
are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our sys-
tem of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound
to submit to that supremacy.49
While the officer suit fiction was tailored on one side to pro-
tect the common law property and liberty interests of individuals,
on the other side it was designed to preclude suits against the sov-
ereign for the payment of bonds, securities and other forms of pub-
lic debt. The courts reasoned that an officer could not be held lia-
ble for the sovereign's contracts and debts since, under common
law agency principles, he was not a party to these obligations."
But this limitation on the officer suit fiction was also somewhat
arbitrary. If the courts had pursued the common law fiction to an
extreme, the officer's participation in the creation of the obligation
could have been viewed as his own action and thus he would have
been liable as a party to the obligation. Still, sovereign immunity
was upheld in these cases, 51 not so much because the awards in
these cases would have effects on the treasury, but rather because
'7 Lee, 106 US at 218-19. See also, the earlier case Meigs v McClung's Lessee, 13 US 11
(1815).
11 Once the Court determined that the United States could not have constitutionally
authorized the taking of the plaintiffs land, it then treated the suit as "a suit between two
citizens [the plaintiff and the defendant officer] for the ownership of real estate." Lee, 106
US at 221. Yet, this statement seems a mere afterthought by the Court, for nearly the entire
opinion discusses the need for courts to decide "upon the rights in controversy between
[citizens] and the government." Id at 220.
11 Id at 220. The holding in Lee has been limited in that the officer suit fiction is not
generally available if the federal government has provided an adequate remedy to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the taking. See Larson v Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 US 682 (1949);
see also discussion in note 29.
" Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 153 (cited in note 36).
51 See, for example, Louisiana v Jumel, 107 US 711 (1882); In re Ayers, 123 US 443
(1887).
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sovereign immunity was an implicit risk of government bonds5 2
and because the problem of public debt was a volatile political
question. 3 Indeed, the passage of the Eleventh Amendment can be
directly linked to the political backlash from the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm v Georgia,54 a case that involved a state's lia-
bility for debts incurred during the course of the Revolutionary
War.5 5 In this narrow set of cases, it makes sense to view sovereign
immunity as an absolute jurisdictional bar. As a matter of neces-
sity, the framers never intended for the courts to enforce public
contracts and debts against unconsenting sovereign entities. 6
B. Early Twentieth Century Expansion of the Officer Suit Fiction
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court was
presented with a case that required a clear choice: Either adhere to
the nineteenth century common law conception of the officer suit
fiction, or extend the fiction to provide adequate protection for
constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Court chose the latter.
Cited in Edelman as a "watershed '57 case in sovereign immu-
52 Much like bankruptcy and limited liability in corporation law, sovereign immunity
was, and still is, an unavoidable risk attached to government securities. See also, Gibbons,
83 Colum L Rev at 1998 (cited in note 24) (noting that the reasoning of In re Ayers, 123 US
443 (1887), would make sovereign immunity an implied term in all public securities.) In-
deed, when Alexander Hamilton recognized that sovereign immunity was a "general practice
of mankind" and an exemption "now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union," he focused on the state's "privilege of paying their own debts in their own way."
Federalist 81, in Federalist Papers at 481, 487-88 (cited in note 16). Of course, this reason-
ing places a practical limitation on Fletcher v Peck, 10 US 87 (1810) (holding that the Con-
tracts Clause prohibits a state from repudiating land grants), but does not overrule it since
that case did not involve a promise to pay money obligation in the future.
53 See Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1973-2005 (detailing the immense political pressures
on the post-Reconstruction era Court not to enforce bond obligations against unconsent-
ing-and possibly insolvent-Southern states) (cited in note 24). Indeed, the political prob-
lem of public debt pervades the history of the United States. At least one historian has
suggested that the problem of enforcing public obligations provided the major political im-
petus for creating the federal Constitution. See Charles A. Beard, The Economic Interpre-
tation of the Constitution of the United States 16-18, and 32-40 (Macmillan, 1944). The
problem of government debt continues today, and if a state or the federal government was
forced to restructure or repudiate its debt, the Supreme Court would likely resurrect the full
force of sovereign immunity doctrine.
54 2 US 419 (1793).
55 See Pennhurst, 465 US at 151 (Stevens dissenting) ("There is general agreement that
the Amendment was passed because the States were fearful that federal courts would force
them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin.")
56 Hamilton, for example, believed not only that the courts should not compel the
states or the federal government to pay their debts, but that they could not, as a practical
matter, compel payment. See, Federalist 81, in Federalist Papers at 481, 488 (cited in note
16).
" Edelman, 415 US at 664.
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nity jurisprudence, Ex parte Young58 involved the enforcement of
a Minnesota statute that regulated the rates of railroads. A lower
federal court found the statute unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment and enjoined the state attorney general from
enforcing it. When the attorney general persisted by commencing
state enforcement proceedings against the non-complying rail-
roads, the court adjudged him in contempt of the injunction. On
writ of habeas corpus, the attorney general challenged the propri-
ety of the lower court's injunction on the ground that sovereign
immunity should have barred the entire suit. The sole issue before
the Supreme Court was whether a federal court could properly en-
join a state officer from filing a lawsuit when that officer was acting
in an official capacity and had committed no acts creating personal
liability under common law.
Under the then-prevailing nineteenth century fiction, Young
would have been an easy case. The state attorney general in Young
had commenced state enforcement proceedings by filing suit
against the railroad. Since the rate statute was unconstitutional,
the lawsuit would have eventually failed. But filing a losing lawsuit
against an individual was not actionable under the common law,
and the Supreme Court had earlier refused to extend the officer
suit fiction to a very similar case involving the threat of suit.5 9 The
central limitation on the nineteenth century officer suit fiction was
that the officer's actions were measured against common law du-
ties, not against the more stringent standards demanded of govern-
ment agents. A court could order the officer to perform those du-
ties owed by all citizens to each other, but could not order the
officer to perform any additional duties that the government might
owe.
60
The Young Court removed this limitation. The Court noted
that it was departing from previous precedent but nonetheless
held:
[I]n this case the injury complained of is the threatened com-
mencement of suits, civil or criminal, to enforce the act, in-
stead of... an actual and direct trespass upon or interference
with tangible property.... The difference between an actual
and direct interference with tangible property and the en-
"8 209 US 123 (1908).
" In re Ayers, 123 US 443 (1884). The major difference in the cases was that Ayers
involved a suit over a state issued public security. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text
for a discussion of why state debt cases should be treated differently than other cases.
"0 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 163 (cited in note 36).
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joining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act,
is not of a radical nature, and does not extend, in truth, the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject-matter."
Although the Young Court refused to recognize the impact of its
holding, the Court in fact had "effected a significant expansion of
federal jurisdiction" by allowing this injunction against the state
officer.6 2 Federal courts could now enjoin government officers to
prevent them both from violating the common law ("interfer[ing]
with tangible property"), and from violating the Constitution ("en-
forcing an unconstitutional act"). In effect, the Young Court recog-
nized that government officers may owe duties above and beyond
those demanded of ordinary citizens.63
After Young, it was unclear whether there remained any limi-
tation on the federal courts' power to grant injunctions against
government officers. Certainly, the plaintiff still had to satisfy the
first requirement of the officer suit by proving that the officer was
acting in violation of a federal statute or in violation of the Consti-
tution. But once this requirement had been satisfied, could a court
issue any form of injunction against a government officer, including
an injunction to pay money from the sovereign treasury? Could the
injunction even compel damages to be paid? Over the next sixty-
five years, the Court appeared to answer this question in the nega-
tive, but until the Edelman decision no definitive guidelines were
established.
In Ford Motor Co. v Dept. of the Treasury,4 the Court first
indicated that some limitations still existed on the federal courts'
ability to exercise equitable powers against government officers.
Ford paid taxes to Indiana and later sought an injunction to com-
pel the return of those taxes on the ground that the underlying tax
statute was unconstitutional. The case was thus procedurally iden-
tical to Young: Jurisdiction was based on a federal question and
the plaintiff challenged the officer's action on constitutional
grounds. Still, the Court refused to reach the merits of the consti-
tutional question because of the form of relief requested: "when
the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
61 Young, 209 US at 167.
62 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 156 (cited in note 36).
63 The Young fiction thus created the apparent asymmetry that a federal court will
treat a state officer as an agent of the state for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but not for the purpose of the Eleventh. This asymmetry can be removed if the Supremacy
Clause is recognized as an express limitation on the states' sovereign immunity. See Pen-
nhurst, 465 US at 104-05.
64 323 US 459 (1945).
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state, the state . . . is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity
even though individual officials are nominal defendants."65
The Ford Court demarcated at least the extreme frontier of
the Young rule. A plaintiff who has already voluntarily paid taxes
to the state cannot use the Young rule as a "refund" mechanism to
later challenge the validity of the tax.6 Yet if the plaintiff had
been resisting the collection of taxes, the Young fiction would have
been fully operational. 7 Ford merely requires a plaintiff to assert
her rights before paying over the tax, when the common law right
of possession is still in her favor. Ford struck a balance between
providing a fair opportunity to assert rights and allowing the final-
ity necessary for the smooth administration of the state tax
system.
After Ford the Court continued to employ the Young fiction
against unconsenting states, but only in a limited manner. Though
Young had departed from the common law baseline, later Courts
made clear that the departure was not complete and that limita-
tions on available relief against officers remained. Thus, in Great
Northern Life Ins. Co. v Read,6 the Court refused to issue an in-
junction that would have compelled the defendant state officer to
draw money from the state treasury in accordance with a statutory
duty. The Court distinguished a host of earlier precedents in which
a plaintiff sued "to recover under general law possession of specific
property wrongfully obtained or held" because in those cases "re-
lief was sought under general law from wrongful acts of officials."6
In denying relief sought to enforce statutory duties of officers, the
Court seemed to revert to the earlier nineteenth century fiction,
which would remedy only the "general" or common law wrongs of
officers, even though this fiction had already been substantially
abandoned in Young.70
e' Id at 464.
e The Ford Court explicitly stated that the action was only for a "refund" of taxes. 323
US at 464.
67 Indeed, Young type injunctions became so frequent in state tax cases that Congress
passed the Tax Injunction Act in 1937. 28 USC § 1341 (1982). This statute limits the use of
Young type injunctions to cases in which "a plain, speedy and effective remedy" is not avail-
able in the state courts. See Georgia R.& B. Co. v Redwine, 342 US 299 (1952) (upholding a
Young type injunction that prevented a state tax official from collecting an unconstitutional
tax where no adequate state remedy was available.)
68 322 US 47 (1944).
69 Id at 50, 51 (emphasis added).
70 There are several reasons why the decision in Great Northern was nonetheless cor-
rect. First, the plaintiff was trying to compel the officer to conform to a state, not a federal,
statutory duty. But the officer suit fiction in the federal courts does not extend to state law
duties since the Supremacy Clause does not reach state law. Pennhurst, 465 US 89. Second,
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The Court's continued hostility to departures from the "gen-
eral law" became apparent in Larson v Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp..71 In dicta, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
sovereign immunity limited the available relief even when the of-
ficer had acted beyond "lawful authority":
[A] suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is
claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitution-
ally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested can
not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the con-
duct complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign
property.72
The Larson limitation on available relief could conceivably have
excluded suits over government entitlement benefits. In entitle-
ment litigation, relief always demands affirmative action in the
form of a direct payment from the sovereign treasury. As the num-
ber of government entitlement programs grew in the 1960's and
1970's, the Larson limitation became increasingly important. How-
ever, most courts read the Larson dicta very narrowly. Adopting
the view of Professor Jaffe, these courts emphasized that the suit
may fail, not must fail, if the relief requires the payment of money
from the sovereign treasury.7 The courts generally allowed affirm-
ative relief unless it "would work an intolerable burden on govern-
mental functions, outweighing any consideration of private
harm.""4 Thus, prior to Edelman, the courts used their discretion
to fashion remedies and took caution in granting injunctions that
would require affirmative action or that would have effects on the
sovereign treasury.
even though a federal question was alleged in the case, jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship. The Young fiction should probably not extend to diversity cases given the ex-
plicit text of the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, even if the Young fiction was extended to
diversity cases, this case should have been controlled by the same reasoning as Ford since
the plaintiff sought a refund of taxes voluntarily paid to the state.
" 337 US 682 (1949). The primary issue in this case was the extent of executive discre-
tion allowed federal officers in the performance of their duties. See discussion in note 29.
7 Id at 691 n 11.
73 Jaffe, 77 Harv L Rev at 34 (cited in note 13).
74 State of Washington v Udall, 417 F2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir 1969); see also Schlafly v
Volpe, 495 F2d 273, 277-80 (7th Cir 1974). But see Knight v New York, 443 F2d 415 (2d Cir
1971) (In a suit against a state officer, Judge Friendly refused to adopt the more flexible
reading of Larson offered by Professor Jaffe but carefully noted that "the plaintiff has an
adequate remedy in the New York courts." Id at 421.).
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III. THE ADVENT OF THE EDELMAN RULE
In Edelman, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may sue
a government officer to obtain prospective injunctive and declara-
tory relief that compels the government to comply with federal law
in all future disbursements of entitlement benefits. This decision
redefined the landscape of permissible remedies in entitlement
benefit cases and brought some practical order to the field. In
Edelman, the Court drew a line between the Young principle, that
a federal court could enjoin the actions of government officers, and
the principle implicit in Ford and Larson, that sovereign immunity
imposes some limits on this equitable power. 75
However, in drawing this line, Edelman did not rely on the
"affirmative action" or "unquestionably sovereign property" dis-
tinction found in Larson. Indeed, the Court recognized that per-
missible injunctions would often have an effect on sovereign prop-
erty and the sovereign treasury, but that "[s]uch an ancillary effect
... is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the
principle announced in Ex parte Young. 76 As a later Court
explained:
[T]he Court emphasized in Edelman that the distinction [be-
tween retroactive and prospective relief] did not immunize
the States from their obligation to obey costly federal-court
orders. The cost of compliance is "ancillary" to the prospec-
tive order enforcing federal law.77
In restructuring the law, the Edelman Court supplanted the Lar-
son distinction in favor of a new rule and simultaneously clarified
that, regardless of the cost of compliance, affirmative injunctive re-
lief is available under Young. In a real sense, the Edelman rule
expanded the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions since
now the courts need not deny an injunction simply because it may
have substantial effects on the government's property or treasury.
Nevertheless, the Edelman Court balked at providing a pre-
cise, rigorous test for what relief would be available under the of-
ficer suit fiction. The Court refused to draw a clear distinction be-
tween retroactive and prospective relief, noting that "the
difference between the type of relief barred.., and that permitted
71 "Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the under-
lying purposes of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to an important degree
the constitutional immunity of the States." See Pennhurst, 465 US at 668.
7' Edelman, 415 US at 668.
7 Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 690 (1978).
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... will not in many instances be that between day and night. '78
As a result of this fundamental ambiguity, the Edelman decision
has produced inconsistent and confusing case law that threatens to
deprive plaintiffs of their statutory and constitutional rights.
A. Edelman: Two Ways to Read "Retroactive"
In order to understand how the retroactive/prospective dis-
tinction might be applied correctly, it is first necessary to figure
out what the Court itself understood the distinction to mean. One
possible interpretation of the Edelman definition of "retroactive"
relief is that when issuing an injunction, a court should look for an
intuitively significant event, such as the date of application for
benefits, and determine retroactivity in reference to that date.
Thus, a court could order relief for the beneficiaries who might ap-
ply after the injunction is issued, but it could not order any relief
for all those who had applied already. An analysis of the specific
facts in Edelman should help to explain this distinction.
The district court in Edelman found that the defendant state
officers were administering the Illinois Aid to the Aged, Blind or
Disabled ("AABD"), a joint state-federal entitlement program, in a
manner contrary to federal regulations. The officers required four
months to process applications, while the federal regulations man-
dated a time limit of approximately 45 days. 9 In addition, the of-
ficers were not awarding the back benefits required by federal law
to compensate for this delay. At the time the suit was commenced,
the state had been following these dilatory procedures for nearly
two years.
The district court's permanent injunction ordered the state of-
ficers to comply with federal law in all future processing and pay-
ing of entitlement benefits. The Supreme Court had no difficulty
upholding this "prospective" part of the court's order.80 However,
the district court also ordered the state officials to pay benefits
that were "'wrongfully withheld to all applicants.., who applied
between July 1, 1968 [the date of the federal regulations] and April
16, 197[1] [the date of the preliminary injunction issued by the
" Edelman, 415 US at 667.
" Depending on the applicant's type of disability, the regulations instituted time limits
of 30, 45, or 60 days. 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(3) (1986). For later examples in the text, 45 days is
used in order to simplify the problem.
11 The Court noted that "prospective" injunctions are mandated by the Court's ruling
in Ex parte Young. Edelman, 415 US at 664.
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District Court].' ,81 The Edelman Court reversed this part of the
order, holding that "a federal court's remedial power, consistent
with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospec-
tive injunctive relief ... and may not include a retroactive award
that requires the payment of funds from the state treasury."82
An approach to defining "retroactivity" based on the applica-
tion filing date is superficially appealing. This date has intuitive
significance and, in any case, is easily determined during litigation.
The approach seems to provide the courts with a convenient bright
line rule that limits the officer suit fiction and keeps it from alto-
gether swallowing sovereign immunity.
Under the date of application rule, it is clear that a beneficiary
who applied on April 17, the day after the preliminary injunction,
either would begin receiving benefits within 45 days (the federal
time limit) or, if the state officers took longer than 45 days to
process the application, would receive "retroactive" benefits for the
amount of time that elapsed after the 45 day period had expired.
This is because after April 16, the officers were under a court order
to comply with federal law, which requires either processing an ap-
plication on time, or paying back benefits once the application is
processed. However, the plaintiff who filed on April 15, the day
before the injunction, would receive no "back" benefits even if the
state officers took four months to process the application. The the-
ory behind this rule is that the state was under no "court-imposed
standard to conform to a different standard"' at the time when
these earlier applications were filed. In effect, the state could con-
tinue to process applications fied before April 16 using the dila-
tory state procedures even though these procedures had already
been enjoined as violative of federal law.
Edelman can, however, be read in a different way. The Court
stressed that it was only judging "the award actually made in this
case, and not one which might have been differently tailored in a
different case."' 84 The Edelman Court might have simply been fo-
cusing on the clause in the lower court's order that awarded back
benefits "to all applicants ... who applied between July 1, 1968
[the date of the federal regulations] and April 16, 197[1] [the date
8, Edelman, 415 US at 656 n 5 (quoting the district court order) (parentheticals added
by the Court; emphasis added by author).
82 Edelman, 415 US at 677.
83 Id at 668. This dividing line is somewhat troubling since the state was under a con-
gressionally-imposed "obligation to conform to a different standard" even before the court
order.
Edelman, 413 US at 665.
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of the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court].'"85
The Court might have viewed this clause as non-separable, believ-
ing that the entire clause must fail if any a portion of it was retro-
active. Clearly, part of this clause was retroactive since it required
the state to reimburse the plaintiffs for benefits that should have
been paid all the way back to July 1, 1968 - over one year before
the lawsuit was ever filed. Even the federal regulations that pro-
vide for retroactive benefits require the beneficiary to file suit
within 90 days after the benefits should have been disbursed.86
Thus, the Edelman Court might have intentionally avoided draw-
ing a clear distinction between retroactive and prospective relief.
Indeed, the Court quoted language in a Second Circuit opinion
suggesting that "the prompt payment of funds wrongfully with-
held" will sometimes be necessary to serve federal interests. 7 In
couching its opinion with such cautionary language, the Edelman
Court may have recognized the problems inherent in defining ret-
roactivity based on any intuitive date such as the application filing
date.
B. The Inconsistent Case Law Generated by Edelman
Despite this second possible interpretation of the Edelman
opinion, the lower courts have uniformly adopted an intuitive defi-
nition of retroactivity. The courts normally look for a discrete time
from which to separate retroactive from prospective relief. For ex-
ample, in Medicaid benefit cases, the date selected by the courts is
invariably the date on which medical services were rendered."s
This date provides a natural dividing line between the past and
the present and the date is easily determined during litigation.
Unfortunately, the Medicaid cases also provide a clear exam-
ple of the inconsistencies that can arise by relying on an intuitively
significant date. In a Medicaid case, benefits are claimed by filing
Edelman, 415 US at 656 n 5 (quoting the district court order) (emphasis added).
8 45 CFR § 205.10 (a)(5)(iii) (1986). Similar regulations were in force at the time of the
Edelman decision.
" Edelman, 415 US at 666 n 11, quoting Rothstein v Wyman, 467 F2d 226, 235 (2d Cir
1972).
88 See, Florida Nursing Home Ass'n v Page, 616 F2d 1355 (5th Cir 1980), rev'd on other
grounds as Florida Dept. of Health v Florida Nursing Home, 450 US 147 (1981); Wisconsin
Hosp. Assn. v Reivitz, 820 F2d 863, 867 (7th Cir 1987) (After denying relief to plaintiff
hospitals which were trying to collect Medicaid benefits from the state, Judge Posner noted
that "[tihis case would be different if it had been brought, and a valid injunction obtained,.
.. before the hospitals began to render the services subject to the April 30 statute.") (em-
phasis added). See also Kimble v Solomon, 599 F2d 599, 605 (4th Cir 1979); Shashoua v
Quern, 612 F2d 282 (7th Cir 1979) (per curiam).
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for a reimbursement. The day after an injunction is issued requir-
ing the state to follow federal law, the state might instruct its ad-
ministrators that, in the future, all applications for benefits will be
divided into two groups. For claims arising out of services rendered
after the injunction, the administrators would be bound to follow
the appropriate federal standards. If they did not process those ap-
plications in accordance with federal law, they would be violating
the "prospective" injunction and the court could impose appropri-
ate sanctions. However, for claims arising out of services rendered
before the injunction, the administrators could continue processing
the claims using standards that the court had already enjoined as
violative of federal law. The administrators can thus continue to
violate federal law despite the injunction.
In cases involving AFDC benefits, the quest for a definite time
has proved more elusive, because no one date seems particularly
significant. Many courts have focused on the date that the state
would have mailed the benefits (usually the first day of the statu-
tory entitlement period). Thus, even if a plaintiff wins an injunc-
tion the very next day after the state refused to mail the check
(the second day in the entitlement period), the injunction would
only order the state not to withhold the next period's benefits."9
Other courts have explicitly rejected this approach and have at-
tempted to define retroactivity based on the date the AFDC bene-
ficiary would have spent the money. Under this approach, a court
can order the state to pay a "pro rata" share of benefits propor-
tional to the number of days that remain in the entitlement period
when the injunction is issued.90 Finally, other courts have defined
retroactivity according to the last day of the entitlement period
(usually the last day in the month). Using this date, a court can
order a state to pay the full amount of benefits due during the
current month even though the injunction is issued at the very end
of the month.9
"' Coalition for Basic Human Needs v King, 654 F2d 838 (1st Cir 1981). In Massachu-
setts the entitlement period was two weeks. The checks were issued over a ten day period so
that some recipients received their checks earlier in the two week period than others. Be-
cause of a budget lapse, the checks for the first half of the month were not mailed. The
court believed that each day it delayed judgment would not "result in another day without
funds but rather a third and a fourth week without funds . . . ." Id at 840.
90 Buckhanon v Percy, 708 F2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir 1983) The court did not find that
the state "procedure for delivering checks is at all determinative of whether the relief ... is
retroactive or prospective." Id. The court offered no reason, statutory or otherwise, why the
benefits should be divided into such daily allotments.
"1 Porter v Schwieker, 527 F Supp 150, 152 (D Minn 1981) (discussed in text at note
136); Turner v Walsh, 435 F Supp 707, 714-15 n 9 (W D Mo 1977) (issuing an injunction on
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Remarkably, in all of these cases, the courts have devoted very
little attention to the crucial question of what constitutes "retroac-
tive" relief. Apparently, the courts all share the same premise that
retroactivity can be defined by some intuitively obvious date. Yet,
judging from the plethora of existing definitions, if a single date is
intuitively obvious, it has so far eluded the courts.
C. "Retroactive" Relief as an Obstacle to the Enforcement of
Current Federal Rights
In determining retroactivity, no court has engaged in an exten-
sive analysis of the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions
that grant substantive and procedural rights to individuals receiv-
ing benefits. Yet, these statutory and constitutional provisions
specify the prospective duties that the government owes to such
individuals. If retroactivity continues to be defined by reference to
dates with intuitive significance (as opposed to legal significance),
the "prospective" injunctions issued by the courts may not ade-
quately protect the current federal rights of the beneficiaries.
The conflict between the Edelman bar against retroactive re-
lief and the current federal rights of a plaintiff is highlighted by
the facts of Bartlett v Bowen.9 2 The plaintiff in Bartlett filed a
claim under the Medicare Act for reimbursement of medical ex-
penses. The plaintiff conceded that under the clear language of the
statute she was not entitled to any benefits. However, she main-
tained that the section of the statute that prevented her from re-
ceiving benefits was unconstitutional.9 3 Because this challenge
went to the constitutionality of the underlying statute, the agency
had no authority to decide the case, so it dismissed her claim. By
means of a fictional officer suit, the plaintiff appealed the agency's
decision in federal district court. The Medicare Act, however, con-
tained a jurisdiction stripping provision stating that no judicial re-
view would be available on any claim if the amount in controversy
was less than $1000. Since the plaintiff's claim was for only $286,
July 25, the court noted that "the evidence indicates that welfare benefits are payable at
any time within the month; thus, if ordered to do so within the month of July, defendant's
action to restore benefits... would constitute a continuation of those benefits, rather than a
retroactive grant.")
92 816 F2d 695 (DC Cir 1987), reh denied, 824 F2d 1240 (DC Cir 1987).
The plaintiff challenged a section of the Medicare Act that contains special rules for
claimants who have received care in a Christian Science nursing facility. 42 USC §
1395x(y)(1) (1982). The plaintiff contended that this section violated the Free Exercise




the District Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed.
Though the majority of the Circuit panel upheld Bartlett's
right to sue on purely statutory grounds,94 both the majority and
the dissent discussed sovereign immunity at length. In his dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Bork read the jurisdictional limiting provision
of the Medicare Act as an express invocation of sovereign immu-
nity, 5 and recent Supreme Court precedent supported his posi-
tion."' Judge Bork then argued that sovereign immunity bars suits
against officers when "the relief requested can not be granted by
merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but
will require ... the disposition of unquestionably sovereign prop-
erty. '97 In Judge Bork's opinion, "a claim to governmental bene-
fits" falls squarely within this category of officer suits and thus the
plaintiff's claim should have been denied. Responding to the dis-
sent, the majority contended that sovereign immunity could not
bar the case because the plaintiff only sought a prospective injunc-
tion against a government officer, and that furthermore, sovereign
immunity could not supersede a plaintiff's right to judicial review
as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
On the facts of Bartlett, the determinative question of the
sovereign immunity issue should have been whether the requested
relief was "retroactive" under the Edelman rule. If it was, sover-
The majority of the Circuit panel reasoned that, even though the language of the
statute seemed to foreclose all judicial review for claims under $1000, Congress did not in-
tend to preclude judicial review for any claim that challenged the underlying constitutional-
ity of the Medicare statute. Bartlett, 816 F2d at 700-01. The majority further explained that
if such an exception were not read into the statute, then the limitation on jurisdiction would
be unconstitutional. Id at 703, 706-07.
9" Bartlett, 816 F2d at 712 (Bork dissenting).
" Bowen v New York, 476 US 467, 479 (1986) (stating that a provision that provides
for judicial review of entitlement benefits "is a condition on the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity and thus must be strictly construed."). The Bowen Court employed sovereign immunity
only as a canon of statutory construction. Similarly, in reviewing administrative actions,
sovereign immunity is frequently used by the Court to justify restrictions on the available
forum for the plaintiff's action. See also Northern Pipeline Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 US 50, 67 (1982) (Brennan, plurality opinion) (explaining the jurisdictional "public
rights" doctrine in "reference to the traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which rec-
ognizes that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be sued.") The Court's
invocation of sovereign immunity as a general tool of statutory construction is unfortunate
because an inference could be drawn that the government can withdraw all fora for these
suits. Indeed, if the doctrine of sovereign immunity does lie behind these limitations on
forum and sovereign immunity can trump a plaintiff's rights to due process, then the Court
should not even review the constitutionality of administrative procedures unless Congress
has expressly waived the United States' immunity.
'7 Bartlett, 816 F2d at 727, quoting Larson, 337 US at 709-10.
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eign immunity would bar the court from hearing any of the plain-
tiff's contentions;98 if it was not, the court could then proceed to
the other issues in the case-namely, the constitutionality of the
jurisdiction stripping provision, and ultimately the constitutional-
ity of the challenged section of the Medicare Act. Unfortunately,
neither opinion discusses Edelman at length. The majority tried to
discount the doctrine of sovereign immunity altogether,99 and in
the alternative, simply asserted that the Edelman rule could not
prohibit Bartlett's suit because under Edelman "[p]rospective re-
lief is always available." 00 In dissent, Judge Bork barely men-
tioned Edelman,1°0 as he preferred to rely on the older 1 2 Larson
standard for what relief would be barred by sovereign immunity.
The majority and the dissenting opinions in Bartlett illustrate
the confusion that has surrounded the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in the area of entitlement benefits. The debate raged for over
thirty pages in the Federal Reporter but was never fully joined, as
each side chose to ignore the central problem posed by Edelman. If
the Edelman standard had been followed, the case would seem to
have been decided incorrectly. Since the requested relief involved
reimbursement for medical services that had already been ren-
dered, the Edelman bar against "retroactive" relief (as currently
interpreted by the lower courts) 03 would prohibit the action. But
then no forum would have ever been open to the plaintiff's consti-
tutional challenge. If the suit were brought before the medical ser-
vices were rendered, there would be no statutory jurisdiction;0 4 if
after, it would be barred by sovereign immunity. In this case, the
application of the Edelman retroactive/prospective distinction
98 Ms. Bartlett's suit could not fit within the terms of any legislative waiver of the
United States' sovereign immunity. Furthermore, Judge Bork seems correct in his assess-
ment that the jurisdiction stripping provision could be read as "expressly asserting] sover-
eign immunity as to claims under $1000." Bartlett, 816 F2d at 712.
" The majority derided the dissent's use of sovereign immunity in this context, calling
it a "novel concept," id at 707, based on sources of authority that are "old and infrequently
cited." Id at 709.
100 Id at 710. The court also stated that the Edelman rule was inapplicable to federal
sovereign immunity since it dealt only with the allocation of jurisdiction between the federal
and state courts, rather than a true doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. But both the Su-
preme Court and the lower courts have continued to cite the precedents of one doctrine of
sovereign immunity when discussing the other. See, Pennhurst, 465 US at 914-17; Silva v
Spirito, 566 F Supp 228, 230 n 1 (D Mass 1983).
101 See Bartlett, 816 F2d at 727, for Judge Bork's lone cite to Edelman.
102 The Larson affirmative/negative action distinction has been supplanted by the
Edelman prospective/retroactive distinction. See discussion in text at notes 75-78.
103 See Medicaid cases, cited in note 88.
10" Heckler v Ringer, 466 US 602, 620-626 (1984).
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would effectively frustrate the plaintiff's current federal due
process right."0 5
IV. A CURRENT RIGHTS LIMITATION ON THE OFFICER SUIT FICTION
The Edelman rule should not be read to heighten the tension
between rights to statutory entitlements and sovereign immunity
or between rights under the Due Process Clause and sovereign im-
munity. Indeed, a proper interpretation of the Edelman rule leads
to a reconciliation of these apparently conflicting rights. In placing
a limitation on the officer suit fiction, the Court established a base-
line of rights against the government, much the way the common
law established a baseline. Rights on one side of this baseline re-
ceive judicial protection from unlawful interference by government
agents, while rights on the other side of this baseline are unpro-
tected. However, the only proper way to define this baseline is by
reference to the statutory entitlements granted by Congress, not by
reference to some intuitive notion of "retroactivity."
To appreciate this criticism, it is necessary to investigate the
underlying policy justifications advanced by the Edelman Court
for the retroactive/prospective rule. In Edelman, the Court sought
to limit the injunctive powers of the federal courts, and the justifi-
cations advanced by the Court to support this restriction were
sound. Sovereign immunity does impose restrictions on how
broadly the officer suit fiction should be interpreted. Yet, the spe-
cific rule that the Court created to restrict the officer suit fiction,
the retroactive/prospective rule, is inconsistent with the Court's
own articulated goals in limiting the federal court's equitable dis-
cretion. The following sections suggest that a restriction on the
federal courts' power based on rights established by Congress
would fulfill the expressed goals of the Edelman Court better than
an ad hoc rule of retroactivity.
A. The Edelman Court's Justifications for the Retroactive/ Pro-
spective Limitation
To rationalize the new retroactive/prospective rule, the
1O5 This comment does not address the fundamental constitutional issue debated in the
Bartlett opinions, namely whether Congress can withdraw all jurisdiction to hear a particu-
lar federal claim from all courts. The comment argues only that sovereign immunity does
not extend to cases, such as Bartlett, in which a plaintiff has a current right to due process
adjudication of her entitlement benefit claim. Thus, if Congress has power to withdraw ju-
risdiction in cases such as Bartlett, this power must extend to a broad class of other cases
that is not limited by traditional conceptions of sovereign immunity.
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Edelman Court first noted that retroactive relief might have a
"practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award
of damages against the State."106 Like a damage award, a retroac-
tive injunction "requires payment of state funds, not as a neces-
sary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive
federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation to
[the plaintiffs]."'01 7 Further, a retroactive award has to be "mea-
sured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a
legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials."' 08
In later cases, the Court has elaborated further on the reasons
retroactive relief is impermissible, once again couching its explana-
tion as a rejection of damage awards. In Green v Mansour,09 the
Court described the Edelman rule as barring an "injunction order-
ing retroactive benefits because it was effectively an award of
money damages for past violations of federal law." Damages are
generally granted against private parties both to compensate the
victim for the loss and to deter future unlawful conduct by the
defendant.110 However, the Court has held that, in suits against the
government, "compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient
to overcome the dictates of [sovereign immunity].""'
In drawing this analogy to damage awards, the Court strength-
ened its argument against awards of retroactive entitlement bene-
fits. The traditional core of sovereign immunity is a prohibition
against imposing damage awards on the sovereign." 2 In the ab-
sence of a statutory waiver, a plaintiff simply cannot receive dam-
ages from the government for violations of common law or even
10, Edelman, 415 US at 668.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 474 US 64, 69-70 (1985).
110 See Daniel B. Dobbs, Remedies § 1.1 at 2 (West, 1973). The "main purpose" of
damages is compensation but "[tihere are elements of damages that are not entirely com-
pensatory-punitive damages for example."
" Green, 474 US at 68. See also Papasan v Allain, 478 US 265, 278 (1986). (Relief is
not available for "cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage compliance
with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests such as
compensation.").
112 Nearly every court, including the Bartlett majority, has recognized the sovereign's
immunity from damages. Bartlett, 816 F2d at 710. Congress has also recognized that a gen-
eral waiver of federal sovereign immunity to damage awards might be an unwise policy
choice. In 1976, Congress waived a large portion of the federal government's sovereign im-
munity, yet it explicitly limited the waiver to actions "seeking other than money damages."
5 USC § 702 (1982). Furthermore, the Federal Tort Claims Act has expressly reserved the
United States' sovereign immunity as to punitive damages. 28 USC § 2674 (1982) (providing
that the United States "shall not be liable ... for punitive damages.").
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constitutional rights. For example, if a person's home is invaded in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, that person has no damage
remedy against the government.113 Indeed, if the federal courts
could employ general equitable powers to fashion damage awards
against the government, the doctrine of sovereign immunity could
no longer "be conceived of as having any present force."114
While Edelman expressly prohibited the imposition of damage
awards against the government, the Court also specifically allowed
prospective relief. Later courts have declared that prospective re-
lief "fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young"' which is
"the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. '" 16 But the
Court has emphasized that the federal rights must be current and
the violation ongoing in order for the Young rule to operate:
Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of fed-
eral law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in
which federal law has been violated at one time or over a pe-
riod of time in the past. 1
7
Given this interpretation of Young, the Edelman decision be-
comes a choice in how and when federal law will be enforced
against government officers. The retroactive/prospective distinc-
tion of the Edelman Court defines that enforcement in two ways:
First, the distinction assures that a government will not be liable
for damage awards imposed by the courts in their equitable discre-
tion. Second, it allows the vindication of current federal rights
through direct injunctions against government officers. Given these
two goals of the Edelman distinction, the conflict between enforc-
ing current federal rights and preserving sovereign immunity
M18 The only damage remedies that are available to such a plaintiff are against the gov-
ernment officers in their individual capacity. For state officers, the cause of action derives
from the common law of torts or from 42 USC § 1983. For federal officers, damage actions
can be maintained directly under the Constitution. See Bivens v Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971). These suits are maintained
against the officer in her personal capacity, and the officer, not the government, is held
personally accountable for the payment of any money damage award. See also note 4 (dis-
cussing the difference between the officer suit fiction and suits against officers in their indi-
vidual capacity).
14 Edelman, 415 US at 665. See also Pennhurst, 465 US at 105 ("[In Edelman], we
declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would
effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.").
"s Pennhurst, 465 US at 106.
116 Id at 105. Of course, this underlying purpose pre-dates Young. Historically, the goal
of the officer suit fiction has always been to enforce individual rights against unconsenting
sovereigns. See discussion in text at notes 22-23 and in section H.A.
11 Papasan, 478 US at 277-78.
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should not exist. A federal court should always have the power to
enjoin ongoing violations of federal law; it should not have the
power to impose damages on the public treasury as a result of an
officer's past violations. Yet, as the fierce debate between the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Bartlett illustrates, Edelman has
created tensions between current federal rights and sovereign
immunity.
Why have these tensions developed? One easy answer is that
the lower courts have misinterpreted the Edelman rule and that
the ad hoc, intuitive approaches taken by these courts is not in
accord with Edelman.118 However, the Supreme Court has dis-
cussed the Edelman rule in many later cases and it has never
noted such systematic misinterpretation by the lower courts. A
more troubling answer is that these tensions stem from a flaw in
the Edelman Court's own implicit definition of retroactivity, a def-
inition that contradicts the purposes behind the retroactive/pro-
spective distinction.
B. A Critique of the Edelman Definition of Retroactivity and a
Proposal for a Current Rights Approach
Once the Edelman Court determined that "retroactive" relief
was impermissible, the question became what relief would be con-
sidered retroactive. In later cases, the Court has suggested that
this question should be answered by reference to the current fed-
eral rights of the plaintiff, since the Young doctrine is designed to
vindicate these rights through injunctions of "ongoing" viola-
tions.1 " Courts should consider an entitlement right current if
Congress has defined a time period for receiving the entitlement
and that period has not yet expired. To determine the current fed-
eral rights of the plaintiff, a court should begin with an investiga-
tion of the relevant federal statutes.
The Edelman Court, however, failed to analyze the AABD
statute to determine what specific rights it conferred on the plain-
tiffs. Rather, the Court advanced an argument formulated by the
Second Circuit:
The second federal policy which might arguably be furthered
by retroactive benefits is the fundamental goal of congres-
sional welfare legislation-the satisfaction of the ascertained
n8 See earlier discussion on the two possible interpretations of the Edelman opinion in
section II.A.
119 Papasan, 478 US at 277.
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needs of impoverished persons .... [T]here may perhaps be
cases in which the prompt payment of funds wrongfully with-
held will serve that end. As time goes by, however, retroactive
payments become compensatory rather than remedial; the co-
incidence between previously ascertained and existing needs
becomes less clear.120
Clearly, this argument is correct as a general estimation of
congressional intent, but there are two major problems with the
Court using it to justify the Edelman rule. First, the argument ex-
plicitly recognizes that the prompt payment of funds might fulfill
federal policy goals. If welfare benefits are wrongfully withheld and
the plaintiff files suit the very next day, a court should have no
difficulty ordering the state to release the benefits. The benefits
may be received a few days or weeks late, but the payment will not
resemble an award of damages; it will more closely resemble the
ordinary monthly payment, albeit a few weeks late. The payment
will most likely be used to meet the "existing needs" of the plain-
tiff. Yet, under the Edelman rule (or at least under the lower
courts' approach to the Edelman rule), a court is likely to deny
relief since the intuitive date to determine retroactivity, the date
on which the state should have issued the payment, will already
have passed. Indeed, on the same facts as this hypothetical, the
First Circuit did deny "retroactive" relief to the plaintiff class.12 1
The second, more fundamental flaw in Edelman is that Con-
gress had already determined that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services should determine how much time must pass
before the restoration of previously withheld benefits would no
longer further federal policy.12 2 The Secretary had exercised this
authority and had promulgated a rule allowing beneficiaries to re-
cover wrongfully withheld benefits if they commenced an action
110 Edelman, 415 US at 666 n 11 (quoting Rothstein v Wyman, 467 F2d 226, 235 (2nd
Cir 1972)).
"I See Coalition for Basic Human Needs v King, 654 F2d 838 (1st Cir 1981). The only
case that seems to have recognized that the Edelman rule could be interpreted flexibly was
Porter v Schweiker, 527 F Supp 150, 152 (D Minn 1981), wherein the court looked to the
statutory intent to allow previously withheld monthly benefits to be disbursed before the
end of the applicable month.
"z" The statute in effect when the Edelman case arose required that each state AABD
plan must provide "such methods of administration... as are found by the Secretary to be
necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan." 42 USC § 1382(a)(5)(A) (1970).
The current statute is even more explicit, providing that "the State will comply with such
other rules as the Secretary finds necessary to achieve efficient and effective administration
of this subsection.., including protection of hearing rights for any individual aggrieved by
action taken by the State." 42 USC § 1383(g)(4)(B) (1982).
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within 90 days after a payment was denied.123 This administrative
rule can be analogized to statutes of limitations which allow even
real property rights to be lost if they are not asserted in a timely
fashion. Since the Edelman rule provides for the vindication of
current federal rights, 24 the plaintiff's rights should have been
read in light of this administrative definition of the "currency" of
the statutory rights, not the Court's own definition.
The Edelman Court assumed that retroactivity could be de-
fined without reference to the statutes and regulations that govern
the program. Yet, the agency's regulations already settled the exact
policy question underlying the majority's concern about retroactiv-
ity. The regulations defined how much time must pass before an
award of past benefits would no longer further the "fundamental
goal" of the welfare legislation. Given these regulations, an injunc-
tion to pay benefits from three months prior to the filing of the
lawsuit would not have been retroactive within the Edelman
Court's definition. It would not be an award "measured in terms of
a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the
part of the defendant state officials."' 25
If the federal statute (as interpreted by the agency) 26 de-
mands that the state pay benefits accrued over the last three
months, then the statute has given the beneficiaries a continuing
right to receive those benefits. The statute has merely defined the
temporal dimension of the right: It exists for three months. Under
the Court's reasoning in Edelman and later cases, no principled
.23 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(5)(iii) (10-1-86) (similar regulations were in force at the time of
the Edelman decision, see Edelman, 415 US at 692-93 (Marshall dissenting).) The federal
courts often defer to an administrative agency's determination of Congressional intent. See
Griggs v Duke Power, 401 US 424, 433-434 (1971). Of course, the Edelman Court could have
overruled the agency and held the statute not to grant a right to restoration of benefits, but
the Court did not even discuss the statute's intent.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall did discuss these regulations and noted that
they required the states to provide a fair hearing and to make corrective payments retroac-
tively in the event of a successful challenge. Edelman, 415 US at 692-93 (Marshall dissent-
ing). Unfortunately, Marshall erred in accepting the majority's premise that these benefits
were retroactive relief and thus could not be enforced against the state unless it had waived
its sovereign immunity. Marshall merely argued that, since the state had freely chosen to
participate in the program, the state should be deemed to have waived its immunity. Id at
693.
12 See text at notes 115-17.
121 Edelman, 415 US at 668.
'2' The agency's rules must be viewed as an integral part of the statute since Congress
delegated authority to that agency. See, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi
L Rev 533, 546 (1983) (stating that a legislature can instruct agencies to design rules to
achieve a legislative goal, and "[iln that event, the subsequent selection of rules implements
the actual legislative decision.")
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distinction can be drawn between the beneficiary's current right to
be paid wrongfully withheld benefits for the last three months and
the current right to be paid next month's benefits. While both
rights have effects on the treasury of the state, both are defined by
a statute (or an agency regulation) to be current rights, and both
further the federal goal of providing money to meet the urgent
needs of the impoverished. Under Young, a court should have the
power to enjoin an ongoing violation of either of these rights. By
substituting its own judgment of how long statutory benefit rights
remain current in place of Congress's (or the executive agency's),
the Edelman Court redefined the substantive rights of the plaintiff
and usurped a legislative power.
C. Current Rights and the Sovereign's Protection Against Dam-
age Awards
Many rights may seem intuitively retroactive-for example,
the right to be paid Medicare benefits for services already ren-
dered, or the right to be paid benefits wrongfully withheld over the
past several months. Under the present interpretation of Edelman,
a federal court is virtually powerless to enjoin violations of these
rights. Yet, these rights must be viewed as current rights if a stat-
ute has defined the rights as current. There is no reason why Con-
gress cannot define a right to be paid money tomorrow contingent
on an event that occurred yesterday. A violation of such a right,
the refusal to pay the sum presently due the beneficiary, must be
seen as an ongoing violation of federal law.
In the application to suits against state officers, the current
rights approach is not equivalent to allowing Congress to waive the
sovereign immunity of the states. Though Congress might require
the state to make a monetary payment to the plaintiff, it is not
legislating a damage award against the state. Damage awards at-
tempt to deter the state from illegal behavior and to compensate
the plaintiff for the effects of this behavior. Although an injunction
ordering payment of money by the state may have some deterrence
or compensatory effect, the purpose of the injunction is to enforce
existing legal rights, not to punish wrongful behavior. Entitlement
programs are designed to transfer wealth in order to help benefi-
ciaries meet their needs. The payment of wrongfully withheld ben-
efits from the past few months still furthers this goal.127
127 The dissent in Edelman argued that:
Absent any remedy which may act with retroactive effect, state welfare officials have
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Moreover, a state cannot avoid or change its liability for a
damage award once final judgment is entered. 2 " In contrast, a gov-
ernment can avoid liability under an injunction by repealing or
withdrawing from a substantive entitlement program."2 The in-
junction against the officers only orders them to follow federal law,
not to pay money to any individuals. Thus, if the state were to
withdraw from the entitlement program after the injunction was
issued against the officers but before payment had been made, no
money would have to be drawn from the state treasury. In issuing
an injunction against an officer, the courts are merely enforcing
statutory rights. Congress and the state legislature remain free to
alter these rights and hence maintain complete control over the
public fisc. 30
D. The Determination of Which Rights Are Current
An investigation into the current rights of a plaintiff should
involve a two step inquiry into the statutory and Constitutional
rights of the plaintiff. The first prong of this test demands that the
everything to gain and nothing to lose by failing to comply with the congressional man-
date that assistance be paid with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.
415 US at 692 (Marshall dissenting). The dissent's focus on the deterrent effect of retroac-
tive remedies is unfortunate, since the courts have held that deterrence of future wrongs is
not a sufficient justification to deny sovereign immunity. The Edelman bar on retroactive
relief is more easily attacked from the standpoint of the need to enforce a plaintiff's current
rights.
1I" For example, a damage award against a state for owning an unsafe toxic waste dump
can not be avoided by an act of the state legislature. See United States v Union Gas, 832
F2d 1343 (3rd Cir 1987), cert granted as Pennsylvania v Union Gas, 108 S Ct 1219 (1988).
Such a liability could only be imposed on a state through a legislative waiver of sovereign
immunity either by the state legislature or, perhaps, by Congress. See text at notes 20-24.
129 Fisch v General Motors Corp., 169 F2d 266, 270-72 (6th Cir 1948) (holding that
rights that are contingent on a statute can be revoked at any time by Congress even when
the revocation of such rights is, in some sense, "retroactive."); see also Battaglia v General
Motors Corp., 169 F2d 254, 259 (2nd Cir 1948) ("[S]o long as the claims, if they were purely
statutory, had not ripened into final judgment, regardless of whether the activities on which
they were based had been performed, they were subject to whatever action Congress might
take with respect to them.") The injunctions against the state officers do not constitute a
"final judgment" against the state since the officer suit has no res judicata or collateral
estoppel effects on the sovereign. See Lee, 106 US at 222, citing Carr v United States, 98
US 433 (1878).
I" The power of the legislature to alter the law within constitutional limits is a funda-
mental principle of government. No legislature may bind a successive legislature through an
ordinary legislative act. See Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress
to Control the Future, 13 Hastings Const L Q 185 (1986). Obviously, Congress and the state
legislatures remain bound by Constitutional provisions. However, no Constitutional provi-
sion commands that money be paid out of the treasury as an entitlement benefit. See Rob-




court investigate the substantive nature of the statutory entitle-
ment right, as defined by Congress, to determine whether the re-
quested relief should be considered retroactive. The second prong,
which recognizes that entitlement beneficiaries have due process
rights under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, circum-
scribes sovereign immunity when the doctrine conflicts with consti-
tutionally required procedural rights. These two prongs function as
a single test to define retroactive relief through legal reasoning
rather than intuitive guesswork.
1. Statutory rights.
Federal courts should carefully examine the temporal nature
of a plaintiff's rights as defined by the applicable federal statute.131
If the right of a plaintiff is still "current" at the time the court
issues its order, then the relief should not be considered "retroac-
tive." Rather, the relief merely orders the cessation of a "continu-
ing violation of federal law"'1 and falls squarely within the Young
exception to sovereign immunity.
Very often, the temporal dimension of the federal right will be
defined expressly in the statute or in an accompanying agency reg-
ulation. For example, the Medicare Act specifically defines a 60
day time period during which the beneficiary may challenge a de-
termination of benefits.'33 Similarly, the regulations governing the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") and Medicaid
programs provide for a "reasonable time, not to exceed 90 days" in
which to challenge a benefits determination.13 4 If the challenge is
successful, the agency is required to "promptly make corrective
payments retroactively to the date the incorrect action was
taken." 13 5 These statutes and regulations define the time periods
during which a benefit payment will still further the goals of fed-
eral policy. Each period is a fixed number of days (60 or 90) plus
the time necessary to adjudicate the claim through a fair hearing.
Thus, in a Medicare benefits case, the line between retroactive and
,'8 Under Pennhurst, federal courts may not grant an injunction against state officers
based solely on state law. Pennhurst, 465 US at 106. Thus, the investigation must be limited
to the substantive entitlement rights granted or required by Congress.
13' Green, 474 US at 68.
.33 42 USC § 1395ff(b)(1) (1982) refers to 42 USC § 405(b)(1) (1982), which states that
any request for a hearing "must be filed within sixty days after notice [of an unfavorable
decision by the Secretary] is received by the individual making such request."
.3, 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(5)(iii) (1987) (AFDC); 42 CFR § 431.221(c) (1987) (Medicaid).
135 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(18) (1987) (AFDC). See also 42 CFR § 431.246 (1987)
(Medicaid).
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prospective relief should be drawn 60 days prior to the date on
which the action was commenced.
If the time period has not been defined by Congress or by the
administrative agency, the courts should infer an appropriate time
period from the goals of the program expressed by Congress. In
Porter v Schwieker,3 6 for example, the court inferred a period of
one month as the time period during which the payment of bene-
fits would further the Congressional intent. In that case, the state
had implemented a new recoupment policy whereby overpayments
to beneficiaries would be recovered through reduced payments in
the future. Under this policy, the state withheld a portion of the
plaintiff's October AFDC benefits. The plaintiff sued to have this
policy enjoined as violative of federal law, and to have the withheld
portion of October benefits disbursed. The court's order was issued
on October 29th, but the court held that a reinstatement of Octo-
ber benefits was not retroactive relief under Edelman:
October AFDC grants are supposed to meet the needs of the
recipient's family which arise in October. Although AFDC
grants are generally paid on the first of the month, they may
be paid or supplemented at any time during the month. Thus,
an order requiring reinstatement of October benefits to be
completed in October does not provide retroactive relief from
the State's treasury contrary to ... Edelman.1 37
Though the court should have been more careful about defining
what AFDC benefits are "supposed" to do-some legislative his-
tory should have been cited 1 38-the court's assumption was correct.
A time period can be approximated by looking to the underlying
purposes of the statutory entitlement program.
2. Constitutionally required due process rights.
While the first prong of the proposed test focuses on the sub-
stantive nature of the statutory right as defined by Congress, the
second prong centers on the procedural component of the rights
required by the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. As men-
tioned above, the courts should consider an entitlement right "cur-
136 527 F Supp 150 (D Minn 1981).
137 Id at 152.
"' Indeed, if the court had investigated the statutory and regulatory framework, it
would not have had to guess at a time period. Retroactive benefits are available back to 90




rent" if Congress has defined a time period for receiving the enti-
tlement and that period has not yet expired. However, Congress
does not have plenary power to redefine rights so as to deny indi-
viduals their constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process. A
quantum of due process protection is joined to each substantive
right conferred by the legislature."" Thus, courts must also apply
constitutional standards of due process when determining whether
the requested relief is retroactive or prospective.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments demand that there be
some basic process associated with every deprivation of a right.
Entitlement rights are no exception to this constitutional protec-
tion. In Goldberg v Kelly, the Court held that "due process may
require ... a determination of the precise nature of the govern-
mental function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action."1 40 As in Goldberg, a state
or federal government may have to provide a pre-termination hear-
ing for certain essential entitlements such as welfare. In many
other cases, due process might be satisfied with minimal proce-
dures, perhaps even a summary determination before a lower offi-
cial. Still, due process is never satisfied when there are no proce-
dural protections whatsoever.' 4 '
Because substantive rights include these procedural protec-
tions, the rights necessarily involve a temporal dimension. Due
process requires time to adjudicate if the plaintiff is to be afforded
an opportunity to be heard. Even when entitlement rights are only
protected by minimal proceedings, the procedural protections are
an integral component of the initial bundle of rights given to the
beneficiary. Thus, the underlying substantive entitlement rights
cannot be considered extinguished until after the time necessary
for due process adjudication has passed.
If the converse were true-if the substantive rights were extin-
guished before the procedures could have been completed-the en-
"' Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 262 (1970).
140 Id at 263.
14 When absolutely no procedural protections have been provided with entitlement
benefits, the courts have not hesitated to find a violation of due process. See White v
Roughton, 530 F2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir 1976) ("In addition, due process requires that wel-
fare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and freedom from arbitrary decision-mak-
ing as to eligibility.... [A] procedure, vesting virtually unfettered discretion in [the admin-
istrator] and his staff, is clearly violative of due process."); Baker-Chaput v Cammett, 406 F
Supp 1134, 1140 (D NH 1976) (holding that due process considerations attach to even an
application for entitlement benefits and that "the establishment of written, objective, and
ascertainable standards is an elementary and intrinsic part of due process.")
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titlements would be no more than a "privilege" or a "gratuity. 1 42
Assume that the government has conferred a right to receive a cer-
tain sum of money on a particular day, but the "right" is defined
so as to expire on that day. If the beneficiary is denied payment,
the Edelman version of sovereign immunity would preclude any
suit since the violation of the right is past. Nor would the benefi-
ciary have any remedy available before the deprivation, since at
that time the suit would be anticipatory. Under this system, no
remedy would exist either before or after the deprivation. Such an
entitlement "right," devoid of all procedural protections, would
much more closely resemble a "gratuity" or a "privilege," than an
enforceable right. Thus, the Edelman rule would withdraw the
protection of the officer suit fiction from an important class of
modern individual rights and effectively overrule the Goldberg
conception of entitlement rights.
Under this second prong of the current rights test, the sover-
eign immunity issue in Bartlett is easily decided. The plaintiff in
Bartlett made a non-frivolous constitutional challenge to the un-
derlying statute. Under the Due Process Clause, such a challenge
can be decided only by an Article III court. Therefore, the plaintiff
had a current federal right to adjudication of her claim at the time
the court rendered its decision. Moreover, she claimed that if the
court enjoined the administrator to apply the Medicare statute in
a constitutional fashion, she would then have a current substantive
right to benefits under the Medicare Act. Thus, the relief re-
quested in the Bartlett case was properly viewed as prospective
relief, which is not barred by sovereign immunity.
The current rights limitation on relief may not be as easy to
apply as an intuitive concept of retroactivity. A rule that demands
a rigorous inquiry into the nature of the plaintiff's rights is bound
to be more challenging than one which, as Judge Coffin has noted,
"admittedly elevates form over function.' 1 43 Still, the rule strikes
the proper balance between the government's legitimate interest in
protecting the public treasury from damage awards and the recog-
nized rights of entitlement beneficiaries. The more complicated na-
ture of the currents rights rule is merely a predictable outgrowth of
the more intricate and less intuitive rights spawned by modern
governmental entitlements.
14 This characterization of entitlement rights was rejected in Goldberg, 397 US at 263.
'4' Kozera v Spirito, 723 F2d 1003, 1008 (1st Cir 1983).
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V. THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICER SUIT FICTION
A. A Retrospective View
This comment has argued that the officer suit fiction was orig-
inally designed to enforce the dictates of the Supremacy Clause
and to protect the rights of individuals against the government.
Yet, the common law rhetoric that defined the nineteenth century
officer suit continues to exert its influence. Indeed, in a recent arti-
cle, Professor David Currie traces the history of the officer suit fic-
tion and, after noting the inconsistencies in Supreme Court prece-
dents, argues that the Court has "gone astray" from the original
doctrine.""' Concluding that the Court should not "order[] officers
who are suable only on the theory that they are not the state to
pay money that only the state has a duty to pay,' 4 5 Professor Cur-
rie advocates a return to the formal limitations of the nineteenth
century fiction.
The Seventh Circuit has cited Professor Currie's article with
favor, and, in denying relief in a suit against state officers, it has
noted:
Plaintiffs sued the state officials responsible for administering
the AFDC program. These officials did not commit torts or
other wrongs against the plaintiffs independent of their imple-
mentation of state law.146
Though the Seventh Circuit did recognize that Young injunctions
are available "to end a continuing violation of federal law," it con-
cluded that "Young is a narrow and somewhat anomalous
sidestep.' 4
In Bartlett, Judge Bork also advanced a form of this argu-
ment, stating:
Bartlett presents a claim that has always been treated as dif-
ferent in kind, one which may be barred, even as to constitu-
"4 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 150 (cited in note 16).
14 Id at 168.
146 Watkins v Blinzinger, 789 F2d 474, 483 (7th Cir 1986). To support this view, Judge
Easterbrook cited Professor Currie's article and a nineteenth century case (In re Ayers, 123
US 443 (1887)) that had been either overruled or drastically limited by Young.
" Watkins, 789 F2d at 484. In another Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Posner also
tried to cabin in the scope of Ex parte Young, stating that "[a] suit under Ex parte Young
envisages a situation in which state officials are being told in effect to leave the plaintiff
alone." Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v Reivitz, 820 F2d 863, 867 (7th Cir 1987). This view is
consistent with Judge Posner's views in Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F2d 1200 (7th Cir
1983) that the Constitution is primarily a document of negative liberties. See text at notes
39-41.
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tional issues, by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.... Bart-
lett is seeking a benefit from the government, not resisting a
government or private enforcement action .... Her claim to
Medicare Part A benefits addresses neither present nor future
governmental coercion against her nor governmental interfer-
ence with the legal duty of a private person running in her
favor.1 48
Though Judge Bork cited Edelman, he ultimately embraced the
pre-Edelman limitation on the officer suit that had been advanced
by the Court in Larson v Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.:14 9
The doctrine unanimously endorsed by the members of the
Larson Court, upholding sovereign immunity in the face of a
constitutional challenge by a plaintiff claiming sovereign
property, describes a genus of claims within which a claim to
governmental benefits such as Bartlett's is a species. 5 '
Judge Bork's position would preclude any suit concerning statu-
tory entitlement benefits, since these suits always involve claims on
property in the possession of the sovereign. Such a restrictive, for-
malistic application of the common law officer suit fiction is incor-
rect, not merely because it is inconsistent with current Supreme
Court precedent, but also because it is inconsistent with the twen-
tieth century acceptance of new statutory rights.
B. The Current View
Given the historical context of the officer suit fiction in the
nineteenth century, the Court has not "gone astray" by making
modifications to the officer suit fiction in the twentieth century.
The changing character of individual rights against the govern-
ment has demanded parallel changes in the officer suit fiction. In
Ex parte Young, the Court merely recognized that the government
could not constitutionally interfere with private property by forc-
ing individuals to make their constitutional challenges in a very
inconvenient procedural posture. That Court was not concerned
with the technical limits of the officer suit fiction. Once the Court
determined that the state's enforcement proceeding would cause
"injury [to] the company, in compelling it, at great expense, to de-
148 Bartlett, 816 F2d at 720-21.
... 337 US 682 (1949).
150 Bartlett, 816 F2d at 727.
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fend legal proceedings of a complicated and unusual character,"15'
it readily expanded the officer suit fiction to protect private rights
against the government. 152
In the second half of the twentieth century, statutory positive
rights have become a major form of private "property.1' 53 The
need to provide procedural protections for this "New Property"
has compelled the federal courts to expand the officer suit fiction.
After Edelman, affirmative injunctive relief is available through
the officer suit fiction. As a repudiation of traditional limitations
on the officer suit, Edelman is entirely in accord with the spirit of
prior officer suit fiction cases.
Still, though the Edelman Court refused to be bound by the
strict common law limits of the officer suit (as Professor Currie
would have it), 54 it nonetheless refused to enforce completely the
statutory baseline of rights mandated by Congress. Instead, it drew
a wholly arbitrary line between those rights that it chose to enforce
(the "prospective") and those that it chose not to enforce (the
"retroactive"). The Edelman decision is thus caught somewhere
between nineteenth century common law and twentieth century
statutory law.
151 Young, 209 US at 149. Minnesota had hoped to preclude federal judicial review of
the constitutionality of the rate statute by setting the fines for violation at a prohibitively
high level-aggregating up to several hundred million dollars in one month. John V. Orth,
The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History
128-29 (Oxford, 1987). Without the modern declaratory judgment action, no test case would
arise since no one would risk the cost of paying the fines if the statute were upheld.
"I Indeed, the Young fiction served as the procedural engine that enabled the Court to
defend the economic substantive due process rights that it had created in Lochner v New
York, 198 US 45 (1905). See, William F. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the
Case of Ex parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 BYU L Rev 539, 556 ("Ex
parte Young finally secured the refuge from state regulation."). The Young decision was, in
fact, considered an extremely conservative decision throughout most of the early twentieth
century. See Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 3 n 7 (Columbia,
1973) ("Ironically, Ex parte Young, the bete noire of liberals in the writer's law school days,
has become "the fountainhead" of federal power to enforce the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC §
1983.").
111 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L J 733, 733 (1964) (United States
government has emerged "as a major source of wealth. Government is a gigantic syphon. It
draws in revenue and power, and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts,
franchises, and licenses. Government has always had this function. But while in early times
it was minor, today's distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale.").
114 Professor Currie believes that Edelman could have been decided simply on the
grounds that the officers had no duty to the plaintiffs. Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 159 (cited in
note 36) ("It would have sufficed to say that federal law imposed the duty of payment only
on the State, not on any particular official.").
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C. A Prospective View
The glimmerings of a truly modern version of the officer suit
have already appeared in the case of Milliken v Bradley.5 5 In that
case, the plaintiff class, school children from Detroit school dis-
tricts, had been "subjected to past acts of 'de jure' segregation" by
the defendant school board and state. 5 ' After seven years of litiga-
tion (including one previous trip to the Supreme Court), the lower
courts had finally held for the plaintiffs and ordered a comprehen-
sive remedial plan. The sovereign immunity issue arose because
the state was ordered to fund part of a remedial education pro-
gram that, the Court admitted, was "compensatory in nature. '1
57
The plan thus seemed to fall into the core of remedial measures
prohibited by Edelman.
Nevertheless, the Court attempted to distinguish Edelman on
two grounds. First, it held that the order, even if compensatory,
was applied only prospectively-the state was only ordered to do
acts in the future.1 58 Yet, if an order is considered prospective
merely because it applies to future behavior, then the retroactive/
prospective distinction is rendered meaningless. As Professor Cur-
rie has commented:
[T]he money was to be paid out in the future in order to right
a past wrong. If that is enough to make the order "prospec-
tive," there is no such thing as a retrospective order; nobody
is ever ordered to have paid yesterday.'59
The second distinction that the Court advanced was that "[i]n
contrast to Edelman,... [t]his case simply does not involve indi-
vidual citizens' conducting a raid on the state treasury for an ac-
crued monetary liability."' 60 There are two serious flaws with this
reasoning. If sovereign immunity is a "right of the State govern-
ments,' ' 161 the relevant inquiry should be whether the money will
be drawn from the state treasury, not whether the money is paid
directly to the plaintiffs or is merely used to compensate them in-
directly. More fundamentally, the Court, in distinguishing
Edelman, is openly hostile towards the entitlement benefits in-
155 433 US 227 (1977).
156 Id at 269.
157 Id at 290.
155 Id at 289-90.
159 Currie, 1984 S Ct Rev at 162 (cited in note 36).
160 Milliken, 433 US at 290 n 22.
Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in Federalist Papers at 481, 488 (cited in note 16).
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volved in that case, equating them to "a raid" on the state trea-
sury. Yet, Congress and the participating states have determined
that such transfer payments are not "raids," they are desirable
transfers of income to beneficiaries. 16 2
The Milliken decision cannot be easily reconciled with the
present interpretations of Edelman, but it can be justified under a
current rights test. Requiring remedial education is not a violation
of sovereign immunity since the plaintiffs had a current federal
right "to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
such conduct."'163 Much like the right to entitlement benefits in
Edelman, the content of this right is essentially positive: The Mil-
liken Court chose a baseline different than the existing status quo,
and under this baseline state inaction would in itself be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause."'
The Milliken decision represents the Court's greatest depar-
ture from the common law officer suit fiction, for the Court disre-
garded the technical limits of Edelman to enforce a positive right
against the state. Moreover, the factual posture of Milliken is not
surprising. As in Ex parte Young, the rights at issue in Milliken
were derived directly from the Fourteenth Amendment and were
subject to mainly judicial enforcement." 5 In both cases the Court
must have viewed the plaintiff's rights as worthy of protection, and
in each case it readily expanded the officer suit fiction to accom-
plish this end.'66 In the future, the Court should apply the reason-
162 The Court's hostility to statutory entitlement programs is indicative of a larger
problem that Professor Sunstein has described:
[T]he Court's failure to put benefits said to be created by the government on the same
footing with benefits said to be "natural" is a clear holdover from the Lochner period.
The distinction itself treats the common law as unchosen and statutory benefits as a
form of "intervention"-the same choice of baseline that affected the Lochner Court.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 885 (1987)
163 Milliken, 433 US at 280.
164
[T]he equal protection clause is most easily read as a self-conscious rejection of Loch-
ner-like premises. The purpose of the clause was, at least to some degree, to break up
the system of subordination of blacks; the best interpretation of the clause recognizes
that the existing allocation of power among the races is both artifactual and illegiti-
mate, and its purpose is, to a greater or lesser extent, to equalize the allocation.
Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 913 (cited in note 162).
165 Ex parte Young involved Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights created pursu-
ant to the Lochner decision. See note 152. Milliken involved Equal Protection rights
spawned by Brown v Board of Education.
166 The lower courts seem to have recognized the unique fact pattern of Milliken and
have accordingly hesitated to extend the holding to other cases unless the relief sought was
very similar. Compare Reed v Health and Human Services, 774 F2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir
1985) (refusing to apply the Milliken holding in a suit over entitlement benefits), with Clark
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ing in Milliken to cases involving statutory entitlement benefits so
as to offer as much protection for these congressionally created
positive rights as the Milliken Court offered for judicially created
positive rights. 167
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has offered a comprehensive view of the officer
suit fiction as a necessary judicial check on sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, it has suggested a limitation on the officer suit fiction
based on the current federal rights of the plaintiff. This limitation
fulfills the twin goals of the Edelman Court by vindicating federal
rights and by providing the states and federal government with a
meaningful measure of sovereign immunity. This definition as-
sumes, of course, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must
yield to the current federal rights of plaintiffs-an assumption that
is valid not only under recent Supreme Court precedent, but also
under two hundred years of precedent invoking the officer suit fic-
tion to enforce the imperative of the Supremacy Clause.
v Cohen, 794 F2d 79, 83-84 (3rd Cir 1986) (Judge Gibbons writing for the court) (requiring
the state, which had deprived the plaintiff of her liberty by wrongfully institutionalizing her,
to fund remedial education "necessary to undo the harmful effects of the past constitutional
violations").
"" Milliken could also be distinguished from Edelman since the source of the substan-
tive baseline in Milliken was established by the Constitution itself, while in Edelman the
baseline (welfare payments) was only statutory. See Pennhurst, 465 US at 102-03 (appar-
ently hinting that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies when a state official is enforcing an
unconstitutional enactment, and that the Edelman rule applies when state officials have
violated federal statutory law). Such a distinction would be unwise, however, given that the
Supremacy Clause envisions enforcement of both federal statutory and constitutional law.'
Moreover, all of the entitlements cases (including Edelman) arose under both statutory pro-
visions and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
